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The MARO Handbook: New Possibilities
or the Same Old Militarism?
Henry C. Theriault
Department of Philosophy, Worcester State University

In recent years some human rights scholars, journalists, activists, and policy makers
have advocated the use of military intervention against violent mass human rights
violations by governments or other perpetrators in societies with governments that
are unable or unwilling to prevent the violence.1 This push is a response to the
failures of outside powers that appeared militarily capable of intervening in, for
instance, the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia in the 1990s. While many such advocates also recognize the importance of long-term prevention efforts and non-military
options, they argue that there will be cases in which prevention efforts will fail
and violent mass human rights violations against vulnerable groups will become a
serious threat, if they do not actually take place. In such instances, military intervention from the outside is the legitimate last resort.2
The Carr Center for Human Rights Policy of Harvard University’s Kennedy
School and the United States Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
offer the 2010 Mass Atrocity Response Operations; A Military Planning Handbook.
The handbook was intended not only as a step toward the broader recognition of
the purported need for military intervention but also as a crucial step toward the
concrete capacity to intervene successfully. Designed for the United States military,
the authors indicate that, with suitable adjustments, the handbook could be used by
other forces as well. The report is meant to guide higher level decision makers and
field commanders who might be required to run a mass atrocity response operation
(MARO) through the planning process of the intervention and to guide adjustments
as the intervention unfolds on the ground.
There are two general questions against which the handbook can be evaluated.
First, assuming that military intervention in the kinds of situations discussed in
MARO is morally right, does the manual fulfill its goal of providing useful guidance
for accomplishing a successful intervention—that is, an intervention that saves some
or all of the victims from violence and ensures long-term safety for them and stability
for the area that they inhabit? The second question is more complex: given the concrete realities of the US military and the impacts of military intervention, is military
intervention itself justified and, if so, under what conditions? At first glance, this
second question would seem to carry us beyond the scope of the handbook, which is
concerned with what should be done once the decision to intervene has been made.
But, as will become clear below, given the concrete specifics and history of the US
military and the ways in which it has been used, the issue of how to intervene is
inseparable from the question of whether it is morally right to intervene, even if in
MARO the latter is disregarded. What is more, the authors of MARO—Sarah Sewall,
Dwight Raymond, and Sally Chin—hope that this unofficial guide, as the handbook
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is presented, will be adopted officially by the US military. Such adoption is predicated on the acceptance of MAROs as acceptable military missions, and thus the
Handbook implicitly advocates for this acceptance, if its internal content assumes
that acceptance.
Both questions generate the evaluative points made in the present consideration
of the handbook.

Steps Forward
The authors and consultants that contributed to MARO deserve credit for recognizing the significant differences between a standard operation in which US military
forces would form one party in a two-party conflict and a MARO in which US forces
would be outside actors coming into a situation of one-sided mass violence. Clearly it
is one thing to seek to defeat or contain an enemy force and quite another to seek to
protect a non-combatant group against one or possibly more military and/or paramilitary force(s). One strength of the handbook is that it details the various actors that
can possibly be present in or potentially relevant to any MARO situation, including a
set of perpetrators that might or might not be a part of the government of the area
in which the atrocities are taking place or expected to take place—a set consisting of,
in some cases, more than one perpetrator group; victims or potential victims that
might have their own agendas beyond survival and other basic human rights; a
host government that might be supporting the atrocities, unwilling or unable to alter
the situation, or supportive of intervention; other states that might be supportive of
(to the point of sending troops in) or opposed to an intervention; international actors
such as the United Nations and African Union; non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) that are already operating in the affected area, doing, for instance, relief
work; NGOs that are not yet involved but that might have a role in post-intervention
recovery; the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; and non-military
components of the US government, such as the State Department. The often differing and even conflicting goals, motives, and methods of different parties, even those
supporting intervention, make a MARO much more complicated than a standard
military operation in a war.3 The report emphasizes such things as the risk that
victims, once the intervention succeeds, might engage in retribution against the perpetrators, in which case MARO forces ‘‘then become a shield’’ for the former victims
as they carry out retribution (27).
Another laudable point of analysis is the recognition that, although there are
some indicators that are sometimes useful in this regard, there is no recipe for predicting which contexts will generate mass atrocity situations (30–31). For this and
other reasons, MAROs will often escalate rapidly and not allow for optimum force
assemblage, while a quick response will sometimes be necessary to have a meaningful impact in stopping the killings of members of the targeted group(s) (33). The
handbook significantly points out that the threat of prosecution or other accountability
must be ‘‘real and understood’’ in order for the gathering of evidence and public
exposure to have a real deterrent effect (35)—a point that the Rwanda and Bosnia
cases illustrate all too well despite the fact that some perpetrators were ultimately
prosecuted in those cases.4
Without explicitly identifying the sources of the lessons, the handbook appears to
reflect certain lessons learned from earlier mass atrocity situations, including some
interventions. The authors rightfully point out that intervention can introduce factors
into a local situation that might exacerbate rather than mitigate the human rights
problem. For instance, they understand that ‘‘if not controlled, humanitarian assistance supplies during and after an intervention may be at risk for appropriation by
8
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criminals, military forces, or other armed groups and fuel black market activities’’
(53). This is well illustrated in Michael Maren’s account of humanitarian intervention in Somalia in The Road to Hell.5 The authors of MARO also recognize that
hate speech and other types of ‘‘inflammatory information’’ can be key factors in
supporting or driving human rights violations, and they call on MARO planners to
monitor and possibly stop such speech as a method of prevention or intervention
(55). This is presumably informed by the role of propaganda hate radio in the
Rwanda Genocide and the debates about this hate speech that took place in US
military and policy circles.6
The handbook also includes some good critical points that support the concrete
planning and execution of MAROs. In discussing each of the seven forms that the
actual military format of a MARO might take, the authors raise interesting objections regarding the third, which calls for the imposition of a militarily defended
buffer zone to separate victims from perpetrators. This approach might be considered
an obvious way of protecting a victim group, but the authors highlight several of its
shortcomings: this approach does not help transform the society in which human
rights violations either are or are on the verge of taking place, it will not necessarily
protect people who are behind the lines of the buffer zone from violence that
might be pursued by others behind those same lines, and it can have an unintended
permanent political effect beyond the protection of the victim group by producing
a permanent political border (77). Similarly, the authors critically engage another
approach, which consists of setting up internally displaced person (IDP) camps to
gather potential victims for easier protection. They point out that this approach
might actually reward the perpetrators’ aggression if, for instance, in the case of
attempted ethnic cleansing, the IDP camps become long-term homes because the
victims will have been removed from the territory over which the perpetrators wish
complete hegemony (78). At various points, the handbook recognizes a crucial issue:
the threat or the beginning of an intervention might actually trigger the beginning
of violent mass human rights violations or accelerate their execution. Because perpetrators might see that the window for action is closing and become convinced that
intervention will prevent them from having any future opportunities to attack their
targets, they might decide to begin or accelerate the violence when they might not
have done so under other circumstances.
The handbook also includes recognition of some of the subtleties of MARO situations. For instance, the writers point out that the government in a MARO area might
not have control over the population and so other forces could drive atrocities (109).
It is much more difficult to intervene in this kind of situation than in a case in which
there is an explicitly defined and identifiable perpetrator group with clear mechanisms
of power and military organization and operation.

Missteps
While, as the previous section indicates, the handbook does potentially advance an
understanding of MARO situations and responses, there is also a range of problems
with the MARO Handbook. Some of the inadequacies of the project are not fundamental and could be addressed if the handbook were to be revised in the future.
Some of MARO’s shortcomings, however, are functions of deeper problems with
the MARO concept itself, military intervention, and the historically revealed but
uncorrected tendencies of the US military in its relationships with civilian populations. Addressing these will require more than the revision of the report; it will
require changes in approaches to international relations and the role of power and
9
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violence in them as well as changes to some features of the culture of the US
military. Nonetheless, revisions to the handbook that address these deeper issues
can help spur these changes while their absence from the handbook in its present
form reinforces the problems at stake.
Although some of the problems will inhibit the success of MAROs, not all of
the problems will do so. Increases in capacity and commitment are sometimes
assumed to automatically be positive moves forward. But even the ways in which
the handbook increases the capacity and commitment to carry out MAROs might
not constitute genuine improvements in the level of respect for human rights in the
world. Moving the agenda of military intervention forward is not necessarily productive, especially if the handbook does not address the problematic relationship of the
military basis of MAROs to human rights.

Issue 1: Reliance on the Report of the Genocide Prevention Task Force
MARO’s authors frequently cite with approval the 2008 report issued by the selfdesignated ‘‘Genocide Prevention Task Force,’’ which was chaired by Madeleine
Albright and William Cohen.7 For instance, page 66 of MARO reproduces an extensive table directly from the Albright-Cohen Report. While the authors are certainly
free to use material from the Albright-Cohen Report, there is no critical evaluation
of what is appropriated or justification for its appropriation. This is, of course, a
minimal requirement for any work claiming intellectual legitimacy. In the case of
the Albright-Cohen Report this is especially important because the report has
received detailed criticism from various angles. A special issue of Genocide Studies
and Prevention featured commentaries on the report, a number of which made
substantive, well-grounded criticisms of key aspects of it, including its approach to
US military intervention.8 While this is not the appropriate place to rehearse those
criticisms, the fact that MARO’s authors miss the opportunity to address them and
thereby improve thinking on military intervention means that key shortcomings of
the Albright-Cohen Report are imported directly into MARO.

Issue 2: Is There an Editor in the House?
Any reader used to decent journalistic, technical, business, or academic texts will
doubtless be struck by the acronym-infused, jargonistic, cumbersome writing of the
MARO Handbook. While the claim might have been made that a specialized military
audience would be used to such writing and comfortable with it, MARO’s authors
repeatedly express their desire to make the report accessible to a general audience.
For instance, in discussing the genesis of the report, they explain, ‘‘We streamlined
the entire process, stripping it of many detailed elements that would be essential
but familiar to military planners while making the language and process easier for
civilian actors to understand and apply’’ (135). Even as they stress this, the authors
cannot resist using unnecessary acronyms: ‘‘Planners also sought to translate the
JOPES process into concepts and terms that would be more easily understood by
the US interagency community as well as NGOs and the general public’’ (133).
‘‘JOPES’’ is an acronym introduced just on page 133 with no role previously in the
report and used only three times in total in the report. The sentence in which it
is introduced manifests a typical use of acronyms: ‘‘This effort was based on the
military’s existing Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) process, but the APF was envisioned to provide guidance to a GCC on how to develop a
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Commander’s Estimate and Operation Plan’’ (133). Perhaps it is enough to say that
the acronym key runs for three full pages (141–43).
The jargon problem, while not as sustained as the acronym addiction, reaches
levels of absurdity at points. For instance, in place of, presumably, ‘‘helicopter’’ we
have ‘‘rotary-wing asset’’ (125, 127) and in place of, presumably, ‘‘communication’’
we have ‘‘two-way information’’ (70). We also find out that these ‘‘rotary-wing assets’’
can be employed from ‘‘amphibious decks’’ (127). The meaning here would seem to be
either aircraft carriers or helipads on other types of naval vessels, unless it means
some type of pontoon-supported floating helipads offshore. Regardless, not only is
the term ‘‘amphibious’’ jargon but it also seems to be incorrect unless these are
ships with helipads that actually come on land in addition to floating in water.
Other non-standard and obscure uses of English include ‘‘socializing’’ as in ‘‘[t]he
process of socializing the MARO Project among various military, government, and
non-governmental communities’’ (101). Quite simply, it is unclear what this means—
does it mean talking up the project in informal conversations, getting formal feedback
through group discussions, or something else?
While it is tempting to dismiss such terminological twists as harmless lapses
or at worst as a form of exclusivism that pretends to superiority over non-military
readers, as some points below suggest, these uses of language might better be seen
as evidence of muddled or closed thinking, whereby certain patterns of language
typical in military circles are repeated without clear understanding or critical engagement. The jargon becomes a kind of endless mantra that displaces genuine thinking
and expression.
There are also structural writing issues. For example, how do the different
‘‘approaches’’ to MAROs, that is, methods of actual military interventions (e.g., imposing a buffer zone between perpetrators and victims [70–87]); ‘‘lines of effort,’’
that is, all major functions that are necessary and collectively sufficient to achieve
success (88–95); and MARO phases (95–100) relate to one another? For instance,
how does a variation in military approach require changes in the ‘‘lines of effort’’ to
achieve success for that approach? The report does not explain the interrelationships
among these aspects of planning. An example of where this would appear essential
is the discussion of MARO Phase II, ‘‘Seize the Initiative,’’ which focuses on the
beginning of military operations (on ‘‘D-Day’’ [97]). Will the features of this phase
vary depending on the approach to military operations? Do some features but not
others apply to some but not all approaches?

Issue 3: Abstraction and Pro-Forma Lists
The handbook is supposed to provide a process for planning a MARO that will
include the things that need to be thought out ahead of time and during the implementation of the plan. While clearly some kind of generic template—possibly an
extensive one—could be used as a framework for planning, the handbook limits itself
to generic templates, despite the authors’ claim that in their writing process they
wished to avoid ‘‘any attempt to create a universal or generic plan’’ (133). These
templates are detailed in that they often include lists of all sorts of elements that
might be necessary to a plan as well as many considerations of potential problems
or obstacles that might be relevant. At the same time, the templates remain pro
forma—that is, an abstract list of all sorts of possible issues that seem produced
a priori, without an attempt to engage the real issues that have occurred in real
attempts at humanitarian military intervention, such as in Somalia. While, as stated
above, these experiences might have informed some of the details presented abstractly
11
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in the handbook, by incorporating the details in an abstract manner, there is no
indication of how they relate to actual interventions. In other words, planners are
not shown how these detailed lists of considerations and the extensive templates
for plans relate to concrete, on-the-ground situations. At too many points MARO
becomes merely a sequence of lists following lists following lists, with no analysis,
context, or application to concrete situations that would help in real planning
for real operations (see, for example, 37–39, 51–57, 63–64, 90–95). Items are often
obvious or generic, of the form ‘‘Laundry can consist of socks, underwear, pants,
shirts, towels, etc. Towels might mean bath towels or dish towels or hand towels.
The possibility that ‘pants’ might include shorts should be considered.’’
Discussing the link between planned and real, concrete (as opposed to generic)
situations would have made the handbook much more useful. For instance, while
the ‘‘Draft Strategic Guidance’’ (106–7) could be employed in planning, without a
link to specific situations established through examples, MARO commanders are
left with the entire burden of figuring out how to apply the guidance to real situations without having the benefit of the experiences of others who have tried to do
this kind of thing or any concrete analyses of the links to specific situations. The
hard part of planning is too often left as an exercise for the reader.
A typical example, selected from many possibilities, of where a concrete example
drawn from real experience would have increased the handbook’s value serves to
illustrate this:
MARO plans will normally follow this process, although they may be complicated both
by a lack of specific and timely guidance as well as by high-level participation in the
planning process because of the politically sensitive nature and potential media glare
put on a MARO, particularly with respect to COA development and selection. (42)

Without a concrete example, this says little more than ‘‘things might be complicated
and planning must take this into consideration.’’ Explaining how things might be
complicated using specific examples would be very helpful. Indeed, given that there
have been a number of humanitarian interventions in recent years and that MARO’s
authors seem to consider the military form of the invasions and subsequent occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan to be similar to MAROs, the authors could have discussed how these operations worked and how various aspects of the suggestions for
planning worked or would work relative to each of the different actual situations, all
with the benefit of hindsight. Rather than presenting planners with generic, abstract
situations into which to fit their real situations, Sewall, Raymond, and Chin could
have given planners real situations as reference points to make real decisions about
what would be likely to work and not to work in a given specific MARO situation.
At times MARO reads like a geometry textbook without any illustrations. At least
at some points, students need to look at figures of right triangles to understand
certain properties of right triangles that have previously been presented by abstract
definition.
While the inclusion of concrete illustrations drawn from historical events would
have been a significant improvement, the authors should have gone even further by
testing each of their plan templates, assumptions, various lists, ‘‘approaches,’’ ‘‘lines
of effort,’’ phasing schemes, and so forth against real past operations and MARO
situations. This would have transformed much of the handbook’s content from
generic, seemingly a priori speculation into genuine empirically-based analysis.
A similar limitation is revealed when the authors assert that a ‘‘brief historical
overview’’ of a MARO situation might be helpful for the planning process (43). There
12
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are two issues with this assertion. First, part of the problem relative to MARO
situations is that outsiders, including the US government, rely on ‘‘brief historical
overviews’’ that contain simplifications and ‘‘standard wisdom’’ about a situation,
rather than factual analysis that is nuanced and accurate and has genuine explanatory value. For instance, the Rwandan Genocide was simplistically misrepresented
by US policy makers and journalists as an intractable centuries-old ethnic conflict
rather than the result of a complex set of contemporary forces that culminated in a
well-calculated attempt by the ruling Interahamwe to retain power in the face of an
impending shift to electoral democracy in Rwanda,9 a project that more instrumentalized ‘‘ethnic hatred’’ than was generated by it.10 Second, the authors do not
explain what specifically in a historical overview would be useful and in what ways.
They too should have provided historical overviews of past MARO situations and
discussions of how they could have been used for MARO planning to illustrate their
meaning.
While other elements of the MARO are not always as flawed as its account of the
Rwandan Genocide, the brief historical overview of that case (6) is a good example of
the problems that arise with limited accounts of human rights crises. The authors
present the genocide as having started in 1994 with the breakdown of the peace
accords, without any recognition of the complex political process that led to genocide
as a way to prevent democratization of Rwanda. Shallow and limited ‘‘historical’’
accounts are in some ways worse than no accounts at all, as they provide false information that will mislead MARO planners. The authors could and should have
included examples of the right kind of historical analysis that would support the
success of a MARO, rather than repeat reductive accounts of such events as the
Rwandan Genocide. This problem might have been addressed in part by the contributions of scholars, in addition to that of military leaders, to the research, conceptualization, and writing processes.
It might be argued that this level of specificity (i.e., testing against historical
examples) would have increased the length of the MARO Handbook far beyond
what would be manageable for planners, but at least some specificity could have
been introduced instead of the rather significant amount of repetition in the work.
For instance, the possibility that victims can potentially become perpetrators is
unnecessarily repeated a number of times.
Similarly, we have an abstract assertion, ‘‘Understanding a perpetrator’s motivations is essential for determining how best to counteract,’’ 11 followed by a list of
different possible motivations (45), but we do not have suggestions on how the
specific possible motivations might be addressed with specific courses of action or
how responses would vary based on different perpetrator motivations. Possible motivations are simply listed. Identifying different motives is not enough for planning;
real models for what to do once the motives are identified are necessary. This is
another example of the authors offering extensive lists of considerations without
adequate (or any) guidance on how to relate those lists to real situations and actions.
An additional point relates to an issue that will be treated in greater detail
below. The planning schemes presented in the handbook assume that US military
personnel at various levels in MAROs operate as automatons, simply following
orders and not engaging in any self-directed or divergent activities. Indeed, leaders
and soldiers are treated in the abstract, never actually mentioned or evaluated, as
if they have no history, no problems, or other features. There is no discussion of the
kind of preparation, training, or selection process that might go into putting together
a force that would have the right understanding of and regard for human rights
13
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concerns—not simply military training—to carry out a MARO successfully. While
the authors call for the consideration of all sorts of nuances of the perpetrators,
victims, and other groups, there is absolutely no consideration of similar issues
regarding US forces. As will be discussed in detail below, there is no mention of
potential human right violations by U.S. troops, let alone elements of the planning
process devoted to anticipating and preventing such abuses.

Issue 4: Optimism
While in some circumstances, an optimistic view of a situation might be useful by
motivating actors to attempt to do what they might otherwise not have done and to
have the confidence to push forward despite obstacles, in the planning process of a
military mission optimism can obscure or cause to be discounted or spun facts that
have life-and-death implications. MARO’s authors tend to be realistic (if abstract)
and recognize many obstacles and potential problems arising in any MARO situation. At the same time, there are points where they display naı̈veté. In listing
Flexible Deterrent Options, the authors claim that a show of force can be made
by inviting regional leaders on US naval ship tours with media coverage. The idea
is that this will convey ‘‘an implied deterrent message to perpetrators’’ (122). It
is hard to believe that people considering or even having already initiated mass
violence will suddenly change their course of action by seeing US naval ships up
close. The authors offer no evidence that this type of approach has ever worked. On
the one hand, if the perpetrators are motivated in a way that trumps risk analysis,
then no threat of any level of power will change their minds. On the other hand, if
they are more calculating they are also likely to be sophisticated enough to understand the meaninglessness of such gestures.
Another example occurs on page 90: ‘‘Short-term efforts include dissuading HN
[home nation] leaders, organizations, and populations from conducting mass atrocities, while emphasizing the importance of good governance, human rights, and acting
as a responsible member of the international community.’’ The idea that the drive to
commit human rights violations is such a surface phenomenon that this kind of
response will have any impact at all would appear to be naı̈ve even without reference
to the many historical cases that belie it.
A yet further example can be found in the discussion of PSYOPs (‘‘psychological
operations’’): ‘‘All potential perpetrators are informed that they have the option of
behaving responsibly or suffering the consequences’’ (124). The problem here is not
just that this is unlikely to have any positive effects, but that this suggestion seems
to be based on a simplistic and inaccurate notion of what motivates and produces
violent mass human rights violations.

Issue 5: The Power of Euphemism
Jargon and the excessive use of acronyms are, presumably, innocent writing problems
that can be addressed by good copy editing. Euphemisms are a different issue. While
they likewise cloud meaning, they often function to hide what might be problematic
attitudes or facts and thereby prevent exposure and criticism of them. The handbook
is rife with euphemism, including euphemisms that have long been discredited for
precisely such obscurantism. At the top of the list is a term that has been used to
cover up the intensity and acceptance of what many consider unjustified, unnecessary, and largely preventable civilian killings and other casualties in recent military
actions: ‘‘collateral damage.’’ This term appears on pages 68, 84, 86, 87, and 113, at
which points a thoughtful discussion of the contradiction between civilian casualties
14
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and a humanitarian intervention would have been appropriate and meaningful.
Indeed, the apparent callousness of the US military regarding ‘‘collateral damage,’’
the apparent undercounting in both Iraq attacks and other cases,12 and other concerns would appear to require such a discussion in the handbook to redirect military
personnel away from callousness and toward a genuine respect for civilian human
rights, which would seem to be requisite to any successful MARO—successful not in
terms of some notion of military dominance but of an actual net gain in the safety of
civilians (all civilians) affected by a MARO.
Another euphemism used with great frequency is ‘‘strategic communication,’’
which appears to be code for ‘‘propaganda,’’ that is, statements that purport to
manipulate the target audience in some way regardless of their truth or falsity. The
term is used on pages 21, 55, 63, 64, 112, 116, 121, 122, and 126, and a whole section
is devoted to it on page 90. This term hides the manipulative and potentially falsifying nature of such communication and renders it an apparently innocent part of
military planning. The acceptability, to MARO’s authors, of false communication
that might even harm Americans comes through on page 69, where they suggest
that ‘‘issuing travel advisories’’ regarding a potential MARO area can be a tool for
putting pressure on the home government. Doing so transforms travel advisories
into a propaganda tool, rather than an informational practice that promotes the
safety of US citizens and residents. As this abuse of travel advisories becomes more
apparent, the main effect will be a ‘‘crying wolf ’’ effect similar to the use of ‘‘terrorist
attack threat levels’’ after September 11.13 Many Americans will come to view all
travel advisories as suspect and in cases in which they should heed them, most obviously in potential MARO areas, they will not take them seriously.14
While the killing of civilians as the by-product of military action aimed at military
domination or victory does not logically contradict those goals (however unnecessary
and culpable it might be), the killing of civilians in order to protect civilians is
clearly contradictory. This contradiction reveals a core problem in the handbook:
military methods that have historically caused the destruction of civilians and violations of their human rights are now claimed to have the opposite goal and effect.
Of course, the authors extend the euphemistic façade to say that such killings
of innocent men, women, and children are due to US forces engaging ‘‘innocents
without being aware of their status or intentions’’ (68). Innocent what? Even here
human beings killed by US forces are not identified as human beings and are denied
their human status. What is more, their deaths are just an honest mistake, not a
foreseeable result of military operations as currently practiced15, in full evidence in
Iraq and Afghanistan, such that the military has not taken seriously even reporting
this16 let alone coming up with better options for approaching operations. The
suggestion of ‘‘precision targeting’’ is clearly another aspect of this problem (66);
the fact that ‘‘precision targeting’’ is not as precise as suggested17 and often results
in civilian deaths is not even acknowledged in the handbook, let alone treated
thoughtfully.
Should not methods of stopping ‘‘collateral damage’’ have a central place in the
handbook rather than be an issue of relatively low importance that is mentioned in
only a few sentences in 150 pages? And ‘‘strategic communication’’ masks the reality
of propaganda efforts. Here we have a two-layer propaganda process which uses
doublespeak to hide from policy makers and the public what the military is actually
doing, which is to use propaganda in an operation. This doublespeak might also
prevent a process of self-reflection by military leaders and personnel who might
otherwise notice the contradiction and decide in favor of human rights protection
15
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rather than operating in ways that kill significant numbers of civilian noncombatants. This raises a yet deeper issue.
The authors promote conducting ‘‘Psychological Operations (PSYOP) to influence
perpetrators, victims, and other actors’’ (57). The military will attempt to manipulate
through psychological pressure even victims of violence or potential violence. Clearly
dominance over everyone in a situation, even those who are supposed to be helped by
the US military, is the goal here, but this is covered over by a vague term. To the
extent that these activities are recognized for what they are, it is of little wonder
that people in affected areas as well as human rights groups and other NGOs would
be suspicious of US motives and attitudes regarding any military intervention. This
issue will be revisited in the next section of this paper.

Issue 6: An Ideologically Closed Discursive System
Perhaps the most significant impact of the MARO Handbook will not be human
rights promotion, which, for reasons discussed in this paper and other critical evaluations, will likely be minimal if not undermined by it. Rather, MARO’s significance
lies in what it reveals about the mentality of contemporary US military upper- and
mid-level leaders and the discourse they have fashioned with the support of militarist
politicians, policy makers (such as MARO’s lead author Sarah Sewall), police forces,
and others in successive waves from the post-Vietnam reclamation process, through
the re-introduction of blatant militarism in the post-Cold War world of the first
Gulf War, to the post-September 11 consolidation of what might be termed the
‘‘New Militarism.’’ The focus on human rights and the exceptionality of MAROs
offered military strategists an opportunity in the MARO Handbook to break free
from the discursive limits that have emerged and are manifested in everything from
the fallacy that criticism of US military action is ‘‘unpatriotic’’ or ‘‘anti-American’’ 18
to the view that the standards of democracy and liberty require that US military
personnel not be subject to an international court such as the International Criminal
Court for allegations of human rights abuses.19 The fact that MARO’s authors did
not take that opportunity in this work is telling.
The analyses provided in the handbook reveal what can be termed an ‘‘ideologicallyclosed discursive framework’’ in which no potential critical points about the US
military are recognized because they are either spun as innocent mistakes or misperceptions by others or omitted entirely from discussions of military issues. This
ideological closure is a problem for two reasons. First, it renders invisible the many
points in history in which the US military has engaged in human rights abuses.
There has never been a sustained engagement with this history by the US military,
and so the institutions, attitudes, culture, and practices that produced such abuses
and continue to be formed through them remain intact because nothing has been
done to counter, reverse, or exorcise them. The similarity of this aspect of the handbook to genocide denial is disturbing. Second, the report studiously avoids a substantive, explicit engagement with the failures and mistakes of the US military
in regards to past MAROs and other military missions that the authors consider
similar to MAROs, especially past humanitarian interventions and engagements
in counterinsurgency warfare. MARO reads as if it were written in an ahistorical
vacuum, projecting into the future all sorts of suggested procedures and plans
without engaging the past data that should have been studied carefully as the bases
of plans and speculations.
MARO includes list after list, plan schematic after schematic, and so forth,
there are virtually no explicit, specific, comprehensive discussions of actual military
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operations that have occurred in recent history or the obstacles, problems, or issues
revealed in these operations. There is no discussion of what worked and did not work
in relevant past operations, such as humanitarian interventions or peacekeeping
operations. Here the abstractness discussed under Issue 3 becomes more than a
correctable shortcoming; it becomes a method of avoidance. Generic recipes and lists
do not merely fail to include useful information; they exclude data and insights that
would reveal negative things about the US military.
Examples of ahistoricity in the handbook abound. It includes ignoring highly
relevant causal factors, past human rights abuses as indicators of possible future
abuses by US forces, and similar issues. The authors state, for example,
Military actions to halt the targeting of civilians may therefore develop from, or even
coexist with, other operational concepts in the context of a larger campaign in which
US forces are engaged. For example, it is easy to imagine how systematic mass
atrocities could emerge from a security vacuum created by the withdrawal of a foreign
counterinsurgency force. Thus, mass killings could haunt US forces as they exit Iraq.
(14–15)

Here a critical evaluation of the US invasion of Iraq, centering on the question of
how the specific form and approach of the US invasion and occupation have created
conditions that might lead to mass violence if the United States withdraws its
troops, is avoided. The future possibility of mass violence in Iraq is disconnected
from all causal factors: the US military is presented only as a potential brake on
mass violence, not as the key destabilizing force producing the possibility.
The authors also suggest that ‘‘the analysis [of a MARO situation] should include
key considerations with respect to agriculture, manufacturing, trade, gross domestic
product, natural resources, income distribution, poverty, unemployment, corruption,
black marketing, narcotics trafficking, human trafficking, and humanitarian assistance
needs’’ (53). There is no recognition here or elsewhere that peacekeepers themselves
routinely use trafficked girls and women and sometimes traffic girls and women20
so there need to be active steps to prevent this in any MARO.21 Peacekeeping
missions might be motivated by a ‘‘world community’’ desire to protect the human
rights of victims, but that does not necessarily mean that military personnel will
be similarly motivated. Everything depends on the character of the troops deployed
and how they are supervised. The military commander(s) and other US leaders at
various levels should make the issue explicit and caution against any such activities,
monitor personnel with an eye toward such violations, and pursue vigorously and
sincerely any suspected violations. Rather than sacrificing civilians in cases of
accusations against US military personnel to preserve US military power, control,
and immunity from human rights standards as much as possible, in a humanitarian
intervention US forces must place respect for the human rights of all civilians in
their area of operation at the center of concern.
The misassumption that other groups might commit human rights abuses but
U.C. military personnel are somehow immune from such behavior is captured particularly clearly on page 120: ‘‘Positive measures may serve as incentives for Country X
forces or military-to-military contacts to improve their professionalism. This may
make indigenous forces less prone to conduct mass atrocities.’’ This ignores the unfortunately significant number of recent abuses of human rights by US forces, during
and outside of wartime. Most notable are the rampant rapes. Susan Brownmiller
highlights just how normalized the rape and trafficking of Vietnamese women and
girls by US military forces in Vietnam became and the degree to which these became
17
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a part of military culture.22 A wartime to peacetime parallel is the huge number of
rapes, as well as related murders in some cases, documented or estimated to have
been committed by US military personnel against Okinawan and Japanese women
from the time that the island was captured near the end of World War II to the
present.23 As previously, news stories coming from Iraq presumably show just
the tip of the iceberg.24 Perhaps the most publicized story was that of the rape of a
14-year-old Iraqi girl and the murder of her and her family by US soldiers in 2006.25
The relative impunity of perpetrators as well as the lack of concern from or even
complicity of military leaders at various levels regarding the sexual abuse of Iraqi
women and girls26 is consistent with the Okinawa, Vietnam, and other situations
discussed above.
Other human rights abuses committed or encouraged by US forces with highlevel political and military approval or instigation include the extensive murdering
and torture perpetrated by countless human rights abusers trained by the US Army’s
School of the Americas27 and the torture practiced against prisoners in the global
‘‘war on terror,’’ in Afghanistan, Iraq, Guantanamo Bay, and beyond.28 In the entire
handbook there is no mention, not even in one single sentence, of the risk of
US military personnel abusing human rights and absolutely no provision for this
contingency, which has been a constant in the US military for at least decades, in
any aspect of the suggestions for MARO planning.
If there is any doubt that human rights abuse, including violence against noncombatant women and girls, by US forces is a real risk that should be addressed in
any plan, one need only take account of the fact that in Iraq, as in previous peace
and wartime situations, sexual assault of female US military personnel has occurred
at an astounding level. Even statistics from the Department of Defense show that
about 30 percent of scientifically surveyed US servicewomen who served at some
point from the Vietnam era forward experienced rape or attempted rape, often
repeatedly.29 Incident after incident has exposed too many military leaders at every
level as well as many under them for their indifference to hostility toward women
who attempt to seek justice for these violations of law.30 In Iraq, for instance, it
appears to be routine for commanders to dismiss the claims, while rapes are covered
up and the women who report them suffer retribution.31 This appears to be a
pervasive aspect of US military culture. As Sadler et al. put it, ‘‘Consistent rates of
rape across eras of service indicate that violence towards military women remains
an unresolved problem.’’ 32 While the rapes of US servicewomen are of tremendous
concern in themselves, the extensive and institutionally complicit human rights
abuse they represent is also an indicator of the risk of human rights abuse of other
targets by US military personnel.33 It is a reasonable inference from these abuses
that there is a substantial risk of human rights abuse of non-US civilians in MARO
areas.
It is important to point out that denial of these kinds of abuses does not have
to be the result of a set of explicit decisions or a conspiracy within the military.
Indeed, while in the nineteenth century cover-up and acceptance of US military
human rights abuses, including genocide, was authorized by a broad and deep antiNative American genocidal mentality,34 one can see the most recent wave of denial
as the long-term consequence of the defensive reaction to the broad criticisms of the
military’s abuses in Vietnam, especially as contrasted with the universal support the
military enjoyed during World War II. This defensive cognitive dissonance emerged
as a way of preserving a problematic military culture and conduct in a morally com-
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fortable manner. Similar to the abuses themselves, this defensive reaction does not
need to be seen as the function of explicit top-down decision-making or conspiracy
to be seen as a pervasive problem in an evolving US military culture. As genocide
studies scholars such as Irwin Staub and Vahakn Dadrian argue, the impunity of
the perpetrators of human rights violations not only encourages them to continue
abuses, but sets an example for others toward a broadening prevalence and intensification of human rights abuses.35 The problem is not the result of any one explicit
policy or decision, but has evolved as the consequence of countless half-decisions to
look the other way, encourage, or otherwise enable human rights abuses that have
produced a self-reinforcing process which forestalls the kind of self-reflection and
-analysis that would drive genuine moral accountability and change. Far from excusing such problems, however, the real significance of their genesis is that they have
become embedded at a level deeper than policy and law and thus addressing them
requires much more than proscriptive rhetoric.36
Perhaps the central reason for the lack of factual and historical appraisal of the
US military in the handbook is the source of its content. It is striking that, beyond
the three primary authors (which includes one person whose career has been in the
defense establishment and one military officer), the entire team of consultants
consists of military personnel, many of whom participated in the invasion of Iraq
and other operations that would seem to beg for critical analysis at both the human
rights and operational levels. While it is certainly not the case that all military
personnel think in the same way about human rights, military strategy, and so forth,
the narrow range of discourse on these issues in the handbook in relation to the
obvious points of analysis that should have been included and the homogeneous
nature of the analyses presented provide evidence that no effort was made to find
even within the military true dissenters who could have added greatly to the report,
let alone analysts of the military and others from outside who could have provided
much-needed objective analyses. It is also striking that a bibliography that is
only 33 percent longer than the list of acronyms does not include a single historical
analysis of the relevant aspects of the Vietnam War, the Somalia intervention,
Yugoslavia, or any other such case. What should have been the core of the research
done for the handbook is, quite simply, absent.
The absence of critical perspectives is not only a matter of omission. Where
criticisms are referenced in MARO they are uniformly dismissed as ungrounded.
The authors appear to have been well aware of the kinds of issues highlighted
above as well as others, yet chose to discount actively and explicitly all criticisms of
the US military, no matter how well-grounded in fact. This discounting of facts is
obviously poor scholarship, but it has deeper implications in a discussion of human
rights. Apparently, the authors of the report could not bring themselves to recognize
real and serious human rights issues that were right in front of them, raising questions about the very notion of human rights underlying the handbook. This is the
core meaning of an ideologically closed discursive system. It is closed because all
potential facts and insights that fall outside of a narrow range of ‘‘acceptable’’
discourse are automatically and without any critical analysis dismissed, excluded,
or misrepresented. From within this mindset, legitimate criticisms become problems
to be handled, often pre-emptively, so that they do not derail the military agenda,
rather than reflections of problems with US military culture and conduct that need
to be addressed through change in that culture and to that conduct.
The most typical method, repeated many times, is the misrepresentation of substantive criticisms as mere perceptions implied to be functions of misunderstanding
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or some political outlook such as anti-Americanism. As the report authors state
in reference to the inevitable grey areas of moral decision making that will arise
in a MARO,
Interveners must not only anticipate [moral] dilemmas, but prepare themselves for
criticism from interested parties—to include neighboring countries, human rights
groups, and diaspora communities. The potential ethical backlash could be debilitating. Instead of producing the pride and satisfaction of being recognized for humanitarian
action, a MARO may cause service members to question the morality of their actions
and nations to second-guess their decisions to intervene.
Doing the right thing without being prepared for tough choices and potential
ethical backlash can undermine the effectiveness of the operation and dissuade
parties from future humanitarian action. (39)

There is no concern here that the ethical criticisms might actually be correct, but
merely that they might interfere with the operation and cause moral quandaries for
military personnel. Yet, if there are moral issues with the ‘‘humanitarian’’ action
itself and the methods used to carry it out, is it not the duty of all involved to
take those issues seriously? MARO, on the contrary, counsels commanders here
to inoculate those serving under them from any moral qualms about what they are
doing, a form of advice that itself increases the likelihood that they will commit
human rights violations. If they follow such guidance, commanders will not only
reinforce any existing human-rights-violating tendencies among their soldiers, but
will in fact manipulate or push soldiers to suspend the moral compunctions against
human rights abuse that they have. If this advice is followed, the un-self-critical selfrighteousness underlying this statement—the military is always right and critics are
always wrong—will be transferred to soldiers through their commanders. What is
more, MARO forces are represented as automatically right in their decision making
by virtue of their good intentions. Rather than recognizing that it is in fact good to
‘‘question the morality of [one’s] actions,’’ even when they appear on the surface
to be morally right, MARO’s writers call on military personnel to hold on to their
notions of what is right dogmatically and without taking responsibility when they
make bad decisions, bad decisions that are likely to result in the deaths of innocent
people. This creates a very dangerous self-justifying dogmatism that can mean that
those who are inadvertently creating problems or even engaging in human rights
violations are actually convinced they are promoting human rights.
The authors further inform their readers that
the MTF [MARO task force] could become the target of numerous factions that are
frustrated by their perception of the situation, particularly if their expectations
are not met. Mitigation approaches include strategic communication to influence the
population, perpetrators, and other actors favorably regarding the intervener’s
actions. (63)

Not only are potential criticisms that an operation will face dismissed as the result
of ‘‘frustration’’ by ‘‘factions’’ based on their ‘‘perception,’’ by the handbook, but the
solution is to use propaganda to manipulate them and others to see the operation in
a favorable light. The language here is quite loaded: we have ‘‘frustration’’ rather
than ‘‘critical evaluation,’’ ‘‘factions’’ rather than ‘‘legitimately interested parties,’’
and ‘‘their perceptions’’ rather than ‘‘the facts of the situation.’’ The term ‘‘factions’’
connotes belligerent parties representing narrow agendas that they are attempting to impose on others. That the MTF will become a ‘‘target’’ suggests that it
is the victim in the situation, which could be far from the truth. What if these
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‘‘factions’’ are responding to real problems with the MARO operation? Even unintended problems—as abound in Iraq and Afghanistan—require thoughtful critical
evaluation.
The issue comes up again on page 113: ‘‘Interveners may be motivated by other
than humanitarian motives, which could cause others to view their actions skeptically.’’ Again, the actions will be viewed skeptically, as if this is just a matter of
perception. But the authors themselves admit that the United States might be using
the cover of humanitarian intervention to advance a political or economic agenda.
While it might be in the political or economic interest of the United States for US
military forces to discount such criticisms and might even be useful in manipulating
US soldiers so that they will complete their mission without moral qualms, promoting this in a handbook that is supposed to be concerned with human rights, not
cynical advantage, is a glaring ethical failure. The advice the authors should be
giving is, ‘‘do not engage in violations of sovereignty and other kinds of interventions
under the guise of humanitarian concern when in fact they are motivated by goals
other than supporting human rights.’’
It gets worse. The authors identify as a key vulnerability of intervention ‘‘opposition from other countries because of their concern over ‘imperialism’ ’’ (113). The
use of quotation marks delegitimates the term, turning it into yet another misperception. The implication is that ‘‘imperialism’’ is a term bandied about by malcontents who are always there to detract from the positive image the United
States should rightfully have. There is no consideration that the term in fact does
apply to many US military interventions and that, given this history, the burden
is on the United States to demonstrate its good intentions and lack of military
and economic expansionism whenever it uses its troops to violate another state’s
sovereignty or it engages in similar military actions. The invasion of Iraq violated
that country’s sovereignty with the result of a military conquest whose ultimate
goal many see with good cause as economic benefit through increased and favorable
access to oil.37 Other contemporary examples of military actions that can be interpreted as attempts to advance global US power and influence from Vietnam forward
abound.38 Once more the handbook’s authors miss an excellent opportunity to produce positive change in the US political and military culture, this time by pushing
for a serious commitment to human rights promotion in the place of instrumental
use of human rights rhetoric in the service of less laudable agendas. Instead, a
legitimate concern is misrepresented as inherently unjustified and itself a cynical
rhetorical move.
Even if the report’s authors do not view this kind of criticisms as reasonable or
empirically-justified, they nevertheless go too far in their delegitimation of it. They
refuse to recognize that US military and related political actions in recent years
at least make it reasonable for others around the world to be concerned about the
projections of US military power, even when accompanied by human rights justifications. The authors seem to lack the basic self-reflective realization that people
around the world might possibly have reasonable cause to be suspicious of the US
military, even if they do not agree with the expressed concerns.
MARO does recognize the potential criticism of the disconnect between the
stated humanitarian goals and the realities of some US military operations connected to humanitarian rhetoric: ‘‘the fact that a MARO’s endstate appears to be
humanitarian in nature might not necessarily be accepted at face value by all
NGOs’’ (49). It never occurs to the authors here or elsewhere to ask, why not? This
brings us back to the ahistoricism discussed at the beginning of this section. The
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handbook’s authors do not analyze potential problems such as this in order to understand why such perceptions exist and thus get at the root issue, but instead recommend that MARO planners attempt to maneuver around them. Setting aside the
moral concerns that this approach raises, it also represents a poor way of approaching human rights problems—the approach of developing some limited surface understanding of an issue and then addressing only that, usually in a limited tactical way,
which thus leaves intact the problems generating the surface symptoms.
It is also telling that the authors recognize the criticism that China has received
for support of the Sudan government throughout the Darfur Genocide (49), but they
fail at any point in their work to recognize quite similar concerns about the motives
and effects of US intervention based on active US support for dictators such as the
Shah of Iran, Anastasio Samoza in Nicaragua, Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines,
and Indonesia’s Suharto and for genocides by Guatemalan and Indonesian governments (twice),39 as well as support for human rights abuse through training at the
School of the Americas. This ideological blindness to the human rights issues of the
US military is not acceptable and in fact contradicts the handbook’s purported goal
of human rights support.
Beside the potential hypocrisy of humanitarian interventions by US forces
and the significant potential for human rights abuse by those forces, there is an
‘‘innocent’’ shortcoming of the handbook that could have just as devastating an
effect. The authors fail to consider adequately the possible unintended consequences
of military intervention, even when genuinely aimed at the promotion of human
rights. They do acknowledge all sorts of lower-order potential problems, such as US
forces inadvertently supporting and strengthening members of the protected victim
groups in possible retribution against perpetrator groups. But intervention has the
risk of radically destabilizing the area of the MARO and far beyond, as there is
good evidence occurred through the US intervention in Iraq.40 Even indirect intervention has the risk of dramatically increasing the military capacity of potentially
dangerous players in a situation, as the US support for the Afghan resistance to the
Soviet invasion that helped create Osama bin Laden and others like him shows.41
Direct intervention can do as much as being the precipitating factor in a major genocide, as in the case of the US bombing of Cambodia that perhaps became the key
factor in the rise to power of the Khmer Rouge and their subsequent genocide of 1.8
million Cambodians.42 Central to any MARO process has to be consideration of such
‘‘doomsday’’ possibilities, given how frequently they have occurred in the practice of
‘‘targeted’’ or ‘‘limited’’ military operations.

Issue 7: Post-Intervention Recovery and Economic Development
Post-intervention economic development is discussed repeatedly in the handbook.
For instance, the authors state,
Other mid-term goals [of the post-MARO process] include prioritized restoration of
key infrastructure in large population centers, development of international trade,
establishment of a banking system, implementation of World Bank and International Monetary Fund programs, and creating an environment that attracts foreign
investment. (95)

Two important issues emerge. First, there is no discussion in the handbook of any
local decision-making in post-intervention economic reconstruction and development.
While there is some discussion of the development of governing institutions, especially if the home government is defeated as part of the MARO or collapses because
of it, the involvement of such entities as the World Bank and International Monetary
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Fund (IMF) is assumed rather than left to the affected population. Second, a
number of elements in ‘‘reconstruction’’ and ‘‘economic development’’ raise questions
about the ultimate result of these processes. For instance, what does ‘‘creating an
environment that attracts foreign investment’’ mean? It can mean foreign exploitation of local workers and foreign control of the economy generally, which undermines
rather than promotes the human rights of the local population. In fact, the World
Bank and IMF are often viewed with good cause as mechanisms of foreign (US)
domination and exploitation of a developing economy.43 Two core criticisms must be
addressed in any responsible discussion of these two entities in relation to human
rights: that the IMF and World Bank function to re-mold economic and political
systems to open them up to US corporations44 (typically rendering the affected areas
providers of cheap labor and/or raw materials) and that they impose conditions of
damaging debt on weaker economies that bring them under the control of foreign
creditors and provides significant economic benefits to those creditors through devastating losses to targeted societies and the individuals within them.45 At the very
least, the serious effects of structural adjustments imposed by the IMF on local
economies—the driving down of wages, lowering of safety and environmental standards,
and so forth46 —should be discussed in the handbook, so that planners can decide
whether they should promote or block IMF involvement in the post-MARO process.
There is an additional concern. The general model presented in sections of the
handbook dealing with the post-military process seems to follow the post-2003 Iraq
script rather closely. Despite statements from official US military and other sources,
from an outside perspective it is fairly clear that this ‘‘reconstruction’’ has not
succeeded well and has also benefited companies such as Blackwater Worldwide47
and Halliburton48 much more than the Iraqi people.

Issue 8: Recycling
The authors bill the MARO Handbook as a radical new departure in military and
human rights thinking. In fact, in the concluding remarks to the body of the work,
they include the overused quote from William James, ‘‘A new idea is first condemned
as ridiculous and then dismissed as trivial, until finally, it becomes what everybody
knows’’ (101). The problem is that MARO appears to be much more a recycling of old
military ideas than it is the development of anything new. In fact, it is unclear if any
of the military strategies or tactics presented is a genuinely new approach, despite
the insistence by the authors that MAROs are in some crucial aspects very different
from traditional military operations (17; 23–29).
This recycling is similar to the absence of historical analysis highlighted above.
The recycling is in fact ahistorical and uncritical; models that appear to have been
standard operating procedure for military operations are simply imported into the
handbook without critical evaluation or explicit modification. As already suggested,
the most frequent model is the 2003 Iraq invasion and subsequent counterinsurgency war and occupation. MARO’s Main Approach 1, in fact, is explicitly
modeled on ‘‘the occupation of Iraq after the 2003 invasion’’ (72). It is rather telling
is that, despite the fact that five of the nine members of the MARO Project Core
Planning Group working with the three main authors were involved in the Iraq
invasion and/or its aftermath, there is no critical discussion of what worked and did
not work in Iraq. Approach 5 is also based in part on Operation Enduring Freedom,
again without critical commentary (80–81).
Other elements are also present. For instance, Approach 2 (72–75) is acknowledged as a classic strategy of counterinsurgency dating from 1964 and was pre23
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sumably a mainstay approach to the Vietnam War. Given what would have to be
understood as its failure in Vietnam and how much has changed militarily in 46
years, one would expect that if this approach was retained as an option it would
have been updated to address the shortcomings experienced in Vietnam. Of special
concern is that civilian noncombatants suffered tremendous casualties by US forces
in Vietnam, and counterinsurgency techniques had a significant role in producing
those casualties.49 Approach 5 imports without comment an element that was used
in Vietnam as well, the use of military ‘‘advisors’’ for partner forces (80).
Approach 6 is based on methods used in Iraq from 1991 to 2003 and the former
Yugoslavia from 1995 to 1999, especially ‘‘the use of air . . . power to strike perpetrators or isolate them with . . . no-fly zones’’ (82). While there is a discussion of some of
the negatives that presumably has some basis in these two concrete situations, given
what must be understood as an overall failure in the former Yugoslavia prior to 1999
as well as Iraq after the Gulf War, planners would benefit from a detailed analysis of
how these methods could be updated and modified to address their past shortcomings. Instead, they appear to have been simply imported into the handbook.
By presenting seven different approaches (70–87), MARO’s authors create the
impression of comprehensive flexibility, but if each option is more or less some
combination of commonly used military strategies, many of which have not been
particularly successful even in non-MARO situations and some of which seem not
to be good fit MARO situations, then the appearance of a diversity of options is
misleading. What is needed is not a smorgasbord of the same old foods, but some
genuinely new dishes. It is not enough to have a large number of options if those
options are largely well-worn; what is needed are new options that are generated out
of the specific needs of a MARO situation, not applied from very different kinds of
military situations.

Power Politics
As stated above, good intentions do not guarantee good acts. This is not just a question of choosing between motives and consequences as the measure of morality. Even
good intentions can mask deeper attitudes, commitments, and processes that undermine a stated commitment to human rights. Of course, the standard response is
that the reality on the ground is messy and the best that can be done is a partial
promotion of human rights that might involve setting aside or even directly violating
some human rights. This is not true. And it is not good enough.
Two things come out of the foregoing examination of the MARO Handbook. First,
perhaps the most effective strategy for the US military to promote human rights
is for it to stop abusing human rights. The US military leadership and community
as a whole could dramatically reduce sexual violence against women and girls by
stopping their own violations of women within the US military and women and girls
in the zones in which the US military operates in peacetime and wartime. The US
government could dramatically reduce the number and intensity of human rights
violations throughout Latin America by closing the School of the Americas and
the Guantanamo prison. The US government and military could promote human
rights by ending military occupations, not invading other countries to create refugee
problems, and not supporting dictators and other governments—for instance, with
military aid—that violate the rights of their own people and others. A good 3,000
people would not have been killed in Chile during the 1970s and 1980s if the US
government had not aided and abetted the coup by arch human rights abuser
Augusto Pinochet against the democratically elected president Salvador Allende.50
The United States could have perhaps saved tens of thousands of Iranians from
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the 1950s to the present if it had not helped oust democratically elected Prime
Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953 and installed arch human rights abuser
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.51 Not only would this have prevented his mass
violence and other abuses,52 but also, if he had not come to power, there presumably
would never have been the 1979 revolution that installed Islamic extremists who
themselves have violated human rights extensively. The United States could have
saved 100,000 to 200,000 Mayans had we simply not provided prior military support
and later political support to oppressive governments and genocidal dictators in
Guatemala.53 And so on.
Of course, from the perspective of the ideologically closed discursive framework
that does not allow even the slightest criticism of the US military, such points will
be dismissed as impractical or representative of some sort of extremist agenda. But,
it is one thing to justify US military action based on power politics and ‘‘national
interests’’ and another to claim that it is in fact what is best for those in MARO
areas. It is quite possible that military intervention performed correctly and morally—
without economic, political, or other strings attached—could have saved lives and
promoted human rights in some historical circumstances and that there will be cases
in the future in which this will also be true. But it is just as likely that in more
future cases military intervention carried out for real or pretended humanitarian
purposes will result in the long run in equal if not greater human rights abuses
than those being opposed. Before MAROs are likely consistently to have positive
benefits without significant negative impacts, there needs to be a dramatic improvement in US military culture and the US government’s relationship to human rights.
Respect for human rights is not controlled by a switch, which can be turned on
for MAROs and turned off for US-supported coups. One military will engage in
both, and the disrespect for human rights in one context will inevitably bleed into
the other.
The real question here is not how to carry out MAROs, but why MAROs have
come to be seen as important for the future of human rights. Though the authors do
recognize that MAROs are just one option among many to support human rights,
they are pushing for their handbook to become an official tool of the US military
and for the MARO Concept to be an important human rights idea for policy makers
and military leaders. The only moment of (partial) moral self-reflection in the entire
handbook supports this push. It occurs with a throwaway comment at the end of
the discussion of the seven military approaches to a MARO: ‘‘an eighth approach is
simply to do nothing (or to conduct mild, pro-forma suasion efforts). For a variety of
reasons policymakers may opt for this method, as has been demonstrated throughout
history’’ (87). This is not a criticism of the US military, but in fact a criticism of US
policy makers who have not used military intervention when it has, in the authors’
view, been called for. Where did the notion that policy makers who do not use
military intervention are morally culpable come from?
MARO appears to be a consequence of the shift in human rights thinking driven
by such figures as Samantha Power. Her 2002 Pulitzer Prize-winning ‘‘A Problem
from Hell’’ 54 is a polemic that reduces the problem of genocide in the twentieth
century largely to one of the failure of the United States and other powers to
intervene militarily. In Power’s work there is nothing of the truly complex process
of genocide and absolutely no moment of self-awareness of the role that the United
States played as a perpetrator of or accessory to genocide in a number of cases,
such as the genocides of various Native American groups, Indonesia’s 1965 genocide,
the Guatemala Genocide, the East Timor Genocide.55 Genocides are reduced to the
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crises they eventually became and presented in such a way that, in most cases, only
a military solution appears to have been reasonable—which Power then promotes
again and again. The core is an emotional appeal presenting the executions of genocides, exposure of the attitudes of and omissions by outside parties, and the justified
outrage at what happened, in order to mold public opinion to see military responses
as the right solution to human rights crises. Instead of untangling the knot of causal
factors to locate the full range of culpable as well as innocent actions and omissions
by the United States and other state and international actors that helped produce
or supported genocide, Power ignores the genesis of crises, which makes it ‘‘selfevident’’ that the only thing that could have been done was military intervention.
By dismissing hesitation as an indifference to human suffering or a sacrifice of
human rights to other agendas, with either resulting in a lack of will to intervene
militarily, this approach closes off the kinds of debates over the use of military power
that are necessary for it to be used correctly and with respect for human rights—as
well as offering a quick fix for problems that allows the United States to continue
with global military, economic, and political policies that have contributed to many
human rights crises, including genocides, that Power conveniently omits from her
book.
The accomplishment of works such as hers has been to compress the framework
of discussion of genocide and related violent mass human rights violations from a
full consideration of how they might be prevented—including by having the United
States simply stop its military and other support for human rights abusers—and a
genuine analysis from various angles of the question of military intervention into a
simple binary opposition: either you are against genocide and other mass human
rights abuses and thus support military intervention or you are one of the bystanders who lets them happen. The MARO Handbook ‘‘operationalizes’’ this privileging of military solutions. It clearly follows and supports the Power shift. As the
authors put it,
While military force will not always be required to halt mass atrocity, the MARO
Project helps make credible, effective options more likely and it better prepares intervening forces in the event that they are directed to act. In this respect, the Project can
help shift the policy debate from ‘‘whether’’ to ‘‘how to intervene to stop widespread
violence against civilians. (5)

It does not occur to the authors that the real issue is how to prevent violent mass
violations of human rights, and that addressing this problem in a serious way could
very well obviate the issue on which they focus.
If one must assume that military intervention is the solution to some human
rights crises, the question is still not ‘‘How should military intervention be carried
out?’’ The question is, rather, ‘‘Is the US military a force that can perform MAROs
in an appropriate manner?’’ or ‘‘How can the US military’s relationship to human
rights be transformed so that it would be highly likely to consistently perform
MAROs in an appropriate manner?’’ The MARO Handbook might indeed be ahead
of its time, but not for the reasons the authors fear. It is ahead of its time because
a US military force that could intervene on behalf of human rights in a genuine and
morally correct way and a US government that could choose this path for the right
reasons do not yet exist. And without them, intervention is not a path to human
rights promotion, but a road to inevitable abuse. What is needed now is a deep
transformation of US policy and military culture toward a genuine concern for
human rights throughout their activities and institutions rather than a spotty concern
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for human rights when no military or other ‘‘national interests’’ conflict with it or
when intervention will support those interests. That transformation must include
radical changes in (1) the present orientation of the US military toward violence
against women and girls and (2) its attitude toward civilians in combat and occupied
areas. At an individual level, there are presumably those in the rank-and-file
and leadership of the US military who struggle on behalf of human rights in these
deep ways already. If the MARO Handbook does not support their quest, perhaps
the kinds of analyses contained in this Genocide Studies and Prevention special
issue will.
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